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Article 2

Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives
and Referendums
James D. Gordon III*
and
David B. Magleby**
A lawsuit to strike an initiative or referendum from a ballot is one of
the deadliest weapons in the arsenal of the measure's political opponents. With increasing frequency, opponents of ballot proposals are
finding the weapon irresistible and are suing to stop elections. The legal
challenges basically fall into three categories: (1) the measure, if passed,
would be substantively invalid because it conflicts with a federal or state
constitutional or statutory provision; (2) the procedural requirements for
placing the measure on the ballot have not been met; and (3) the subject
matter is not proper for direct legislation.
This Article argues that it is generally improper for courts to adjudicate pre-election challenges to a measure's substantive validity. Such
pre-election review involves issuing an advisory opinion, violates ripeness requirements, undermines the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions, and constitutes unwarranted judicial interference
with a legislative process. By contrast, this Article argues that pre-election review of challenges based on noncompliance with procedural requirements or subject matter limitations is proper. Such claims do not
implicate the same level of justiciability concerns; rather, they address
the justiciable issue whether the measure's proponents are legally entitled to invoke the direct legislation process in the first instance.
I.

Overview of Direct Legislation

The idea of popular consultation on major constitutional issues in
the United States is as old as the Constitution itself, which Rhode Island
submitted to a referendum.' Today, forty-nine of the fifty states require
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changes in the state constitution to be submitted to a statewide vote. 2
Many states and local governments permit an even more extensive form
of voter participation in drafting and enacting laws and constitutional
amendments. 3 During the progressive era the idea of popular consultation was expanded to include direct legislation-the initiative and popular referendum. 4 Twenty-six (primarily western) states adopted
provisions permitting voters to petition to place on the ballot statutes
(the statutory initiative) or constitutional amendments (the constitutional
initiative), or to refer to a vote of the people an action taken by the legislature (the popular referendum). 5 Today many states and localities also
permit local governments to place advisory referendums and statutory
changes on the ballot.6 Only three states do not have one of these

7
processes for at least some unit of local government.
Access to the ballot for initiatives and popular referendums is conditioned upon the petitioners' gathering sufficient valid signatures within a
specified time.8 In most states, the measure is then certified to appear on
the ballot in a special election or the next general election (the direct
initiative). 9 In a few states, after meeting a signature threshold, the petitioners must submit the measure to the state legislature (the indirect initiative). 10 Only if the state legislature does not enact the initiative or
otherwise satisfy the petitioners can the petitioners place their measure
on the ballot by gathering additional signatures." Five times as many
states have the direct initiative as the indirect, and in states which permit
both, proponents typically prefer to go directly to the ballot.' 2 The popular referendum permits voters to petition to place a recently enacted
statute before the voters. The period in which such a law can be challenged is typically 90-120 days. The initiative is more frequently used
than the popular referendum, in part because petitioners can achieve the
same ends with fewer constraints.
Direct legislation devices place substantial agenda-setting power in
the hands of petitioners and have been used with growing frequency in
the past decade.' 3 In California, more initiative petitions have been in
circulation in the 1980's than in any previous decade, and the number
qualifying for the ballot-if present trends continue-will be larger than
in any other decade since the 1930's.' 4 Other states are also experienc2
3

Delaware does not. D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN
(1984).
Id. at 35-47.

4

Id. at 20-25.

5
6

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 33-40.

7
8
9

NATIONAL CENTER FOR INITIATIVE REVIEW, INITIATIVE PROVISIONS BY STATE (1983) (chart).
D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 36-44.
Id. at 35, 38-40.

THE UNITED STATES 36

10 Id. at 35-36, 38-40.
11 Id.
12 Magleby, Taking the Initiative: Direct Legislation and Direct Democracy in the 1980s, POL. SCI. & POL.
600, 600-01 (Summer 1988).
13 D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 66-67; Magleby, supra note 12, at 603.
14 Magleby, supra note 12, at 603.
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ing renewed usage.' 5 The resurgence of activity has included highly visible measures addressing
such topics as tax reduction, a nuclear weapons
16
freeze, and AIDS.
Ballot propositions are important and visible also because the stakes
are often high, and the affected parties are willing to spend large sums of
money to persuade voters to reject or enact the proposed measure. In
the 1984 Missouri general election, for instance, more money was spent
on Proposition A, the Nuclear Power Plant proposition, than in the races
for governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, and all state senate
and house seats combined.' 7 The 1988 California general election set
new records for campaign spending on ballot propositions, with over
$130 million raised before the election.' On an initiative to increase the
state cigarette tax, opponents raised more than $19 million and supporters $1.7 million. 19 The combatants in the fight over five initiatives
con20
cerning insurance regulation spent a whopping $76 million.
II. Judicial Involvement in Direct Legislation
Working largely in the first two decades of this century, the progressives sought to enlarge the role of citizens and voters. 2' They also
sought to limit the powers of institutions like state legislatures, executives, and political parties. 22 Direct legislation was intentionally insulated
from politicians and normal institutional constraints. For instance, no
gubernatorial veto of initiatives is permitted. 2 3 The initiative process
also avoids the checks resulting from bicameral legislative processes; the
closest procedure is Nevada's, which requires constitutional initiatives to
be approved in two consecutive elections, a procedure by which voters
24
can check themselves.
In general, courts have articulated a policy of deference toward direct legislation processes. For example, in an early case the United
States Supreme Court declined to review a challenge asserting that the
initiative is inconsistent with the federal constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government, 25 declaring the issue a nonjusticiable
15 Id. at 603.
16 E.g., California Proposition 13 (1978) (tax limitation); California Proposition 12 (1982) (nuclear weapons freeze); California Propositions 96 and 102 (1988) (AIDS).
17 D. Magleby, Campaign Spending in Ballot Proposition and Candidate Elections: A Preliminary Assessment 6 (1986) (unpublished manuscript presented at the American Political Science Association's annual meeting, Aug. 28-31, 1986, Washington, D.C.).
18 California Fair Political Practices Comm'n, Press Release No. 88-35c (Nov. 3, 1988). See also
Shuit & Reich, Ballot Props Cost Tops S130 Million: S76 .Million Contributed in Fight Over Five Insurance
Initiatives Alone, L.A. Times, Nov. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
19 California Fair Political Practices Comm'n, Press Release No. 88-35c (Nov. 3, 1988).
20 Id.
21

D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 21-25. See generally B. DEWITr, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR; G. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA

(1915); R.

(1951).
D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 21-22. See generally Bourne, Functions of the Initiative, Referendum,

PROGRESSIVES

22

and Recall, ANNALS, Sept. 1912, at 3; D. WILCOX, GOVERNMENT By ALL THE PEOPLE; OR THE INITIATIVE,
THE REFERENDUM, AND THE RECALL AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY (1912).
23 D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 47.

24

Id. at 38-40.

25

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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political question. 26 A well-known statement by the California Supreme
Court also reflects judicial deference toward direct legislation:
The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for
the initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the progressive movement of the early 1900's. Drafted in
light of the theory that all power of government ultimately resides in
the people, the amendment speaks of the initiative and referendum,
not as a right granted the people, but as a power reserved by them.
Declaring it "the duty of the courts to jealously guard the right of the
people," the courts have described the initiative and referendum as
articulating "one of the most precious rights of our democratic process." "[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right
be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved
in
'2 7
favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it."
While some courts recite a policy of deference to the process of direct
legislation, some courts are anything but deferential when reviewing the
substantive validity of successful measures. For instance, of the ten initiatives enacted by California voters between 1960 and 1980, four were
struck down in whole or in part by state or federal courts. 28 The California Supreme Court struck down a fifth (death penalty) measure, but the
United States Supreme Court reversed. 29 A sixth measure, the JarvisGann property-tax initiative (Proposition
13), was significantly limited by
30
the California Supreme Court.
Judicial involvement with direct legislation is not limited to postelection adjudication, but also includes pre-election review. 31 Typically,
26 Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150-51 (1912).
27 Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135
Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976) (citations and footnotes omitted).
28 Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr.
855 (1979) (political reform); Santa Barbara School Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 530 P.2d
605, 118 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1975) (school busing limitation); Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411
P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966) (prohibition of pay TV); Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413
P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966) (repeal of open housing), aff'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
29 People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 992
(1983).
30 Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 324 (1982).
31 To study both the extent of judicial activity and the issues raised in cases in this area, we
conducted an extensive search of state and local cases through the Westlaw computerized case retrievil system. More than 300 cases were identified and then coded for purposes of analysis. Extracted from the cases were the year, state, type of court, time of review, focus of review, remedy
desired, results, and the most important arguments in the opinion. The sample of cases is not presumed to be representative of all cases in this area.
We were surprised by the high volume of pre-election cases. In addition to the over 300 cases
we analyzed, there appear to be many more which we could analyze with more time and resources.
However, an analysis of the distribution of the cases over time and across states indicates that the
cases in the sample comprise a broad cross section. The number of cases in the sample increases in
each decade after the 1940s, perhaps partly because Westlaw's coverage of cases in general increases. Comparing the 1970s and 1980s, where the Westlaw case-entry bias can be held constant,
we find significant growth over time in the number of pre-election cases. Projecting the same level
of activity in the 1987-89 period as in 1980-86 reveals that the 1980s will have significantly more
judicial activity in this area than the 1970s. This is consistent with Magleby's earlier research on the
level of initiative and referendum activity generally.
In our sample, 39 states have reported pre-election cases. They range in activity from states like
West Virginia or Kentucky, with only one case, to California, which has had 49. Besides California,
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an initiative or referendum petition must be filed with the responsible
government official before circulation. After the signatures are gathered,
the petitions are submitted to the official for signature verification and
certification to the ballot. Courts appear somewhat more likely to uphold the decisions of election officials in the pre-certification phase than
they are after the signatures have been verified and the measure certified
for the ballot. Generally, there does not appear to be a strong judicial
bias either for keeping propositions on the ballot or for removing them.
The primary issues involved in the cases are the propriety of the subject matter of the proposals and, to a lesser extent, procedural issues.
However, in at least one-fourth of the cases, substantive constitutional
issues arise, sometimes as the primary issue, but more often as a secondary one. Most frequently, courts first determine whether the subject
matter of the ballot proposal falls within the permitted scope of direct
legislation. In cases primarily involving procedural requirements (petition form, signature verification, administrative deadlines, etc.), the
courts tend to favor placing the measure on the ballot. When the primary focus of the case is subject matter, the courts are less likely to permit the measure to go on the ballot.
III.

Categories of Pre-election Suits

As noted earlier, the challenges to initiatives and referendums generally fall into three categories, and courts are divided on the pre-electionjusticiability of cases in each of the three categories. 3 2 The first type
of challenge alleges that the measure, if passed, would be substantively
invalid because it conflicts with a paramount law: the federal or state constitution, a federal statute, or (in the case of a county or municipal proposal) a state statute.3 3 Challenges in this category assert that the measure
would be unenforceable and that holding an election on an invalid measure would be a waste of taxpayers' money. 3 4 Direct legislation can be
very expensive. For example, in 1983 a special election on a California
35
initiative was projected to cost taxpayers $15 million.
The second type of challenge to ballot proposals alleges a failure to
meet the procedural requirements to qualify the measure for an election.3 6 These requirements, imposed by state constitutional provisions
or statutes, include the minimum number of qualified signatures, the
the states which appear to have the most pre-election judicial activity are Ohio, Florida, Colorado,
and Oregon. Our sample reveals that cases are about evenly divided between statewide and local
referendums.
32 A fourth category of challenges, alleging that the particular election laws themselves are unconstitutional (e.g., as violative of the one-person, one-vote requirement), are beyond the scope of
this Article because they are not challenges to particular ballot proposals. For discussion of some of
these challenges, see D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 49-51.
33 See infra notes 48-49.
34 E.g., Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264, 276 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Harnett v. Sacramento County, 195 Cal. 676, 683, 235 P. 445, 448 (1925).
35 Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 666, 669 P.2d 17, 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781,
784 (1983) (per curiam). Expenses include the costs of validating signatures, printing ballots, printing and distributing voter handbooks, staffing polling places, and counting votes.
36 See infra note 106.

INITIATIVES AND REFERENDUMS

form of the petition and its title and7 summary, and the timeliness of filing
3
the petition with the government.
The third type of challenge asserts that the ballot measure does not
fall within a proper subject matter for direct legislation.3 8 Restrictions
on the scope of initiatives and referendums are common. Most states
require that the measure must propose a constitutional amendment, statute, or ordinance, although some also permit advisory measures. 3 9 Many
states require that a measure may not encompass more than a single subject,40 which requirement helps avoid confusion and logrolling.41 Many
states also provide that a measure may not apply to certain topics, such as
matters, 43 the court system, 4 4 zoning, 45
appropriations, 42 administrative
46
and other subjects.
Pre-election judicial review of ballot measures typically arises in one
of two ways. First, a measure's opponents may sue for equitable or declaratory relief to prevent the election or remove the measure from the
37 E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3502-3533, 3701-3718, 4001-4011, 4050.1-4056 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-11-2 to -24 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
38 See infra note 107.
39 Some states and the District of Columbia permit legislative bodies or citizens to place advisory
measures on the ballot. E.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 5353 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-146 (Supp. VIII 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46,
28-6 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 53,
§§ 18A, 19 (West 1982-83); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (1978); NJ. REV. STAT. §§ 19:37-1, 19:37-1.1
(1964 & Supp. 1982-83); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Wis. STAT. § 59.07(67)
(1981).
40 E.g., CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(d); FLA. CONsT. art. XI, § 3; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 50; OR. CONST.
art. IV, § 1(2)(d).
41 Comment,JudicialReview ofInititiativeConstitutionalAmendments, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 461,476
(1980). See generally Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936
(1983).
42 E.g., ALASKA CONsT. art. XI, § 7; Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 51; WYO. CONsT. art. III, § 5 2 (g); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-281(a) (1981).
43 E.g., Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 129, 222 P.2d 225, 228 (1950); Ruano v. Spellman, 81
Wash. 2d 820,825,505 P.2d 447,450 (1973); Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 252 (Utah 1982); see
Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CAL. L. REV. 74, 93-97 (1976).
44 E.g., ALASKA CONsT. art. XI, § 7; MASS. CONST. amend. XLVIII, pt. 2 § 2; Wyo. CONST. art. III,

§ 52(g).
45 See Comment, supra note 43, at 96-106; Annotation, Adoption of Zoning Ordinances or Amendment
Thereto as Subject of Referendum, 72 A.L.R.3d 1030, 1043-44 (1976); see generally Note, The Proper Use of
Referenda in Zoning Matters, 29 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1977).
46 E.g., ILL. CONsT. art. XIV, § 3 (initiative limited to subjects in article IV of state constitution);
NEV. CONsT. art. XIX, § 6 (initiative cannot propose expenditure without corresponding tax increase); OHIO CONsT. art. II, § l(e) (initiative or referendum cannot be used to classify property in
order to tax at different rates). In some states and the District of Columbia, referendums cannot be
used to repeal urgency laws, which are laws necessary for the immediate health and safety of the
public. E.g., ALASKA CONsT. art. IX, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(3); Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 52(a);
OHIO CONsT. art. II, § l(d); OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 2; S.D. CONsT. art. III, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. II,
§ 1(b); WYo. CONST. art. III, § 52(g); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-281(b) (1981). Other states provide that a
statewide measure cannot be local or special in character. E.g., ALASKA CONsT. art. XI, § 7; MONT.
CONsT. art. III, § 4(l); WYO. CONsT. art. III, § 52(g).
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Oklahoma bar resubmission of a defeated initiative proposal for
three years. MAss. CONST. amend, art. 48, pt. 2, § 3; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 6. Oklahoma provides that a measure may be resubmitted within three years if the petitions are
signed by 25% of the state's legal voters. The purposes of this subject matter limitation are undoubtedly to avoid expense and voter frustration, and these purposes are not fulfilled if pre-election
review is denied. Oklahoma has allowed pre-election review of a challenge asserting the violation of
this limitation. In re Inititiative Petition No. 271, 373 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 949 (1963).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:298

ballot. 47 Depending on the remedies available in the particular forum,

they might seek a declaratory judgment, an injunction, a writ of mandamus or mandate, or a writ of prohibition ordering the responsible government official not to submit the measure to a vote. Second, if the
government official has refused to certify the proposal for the ballot because of a putative defect in the measure or its submission, the measure's
supporters might sue for a writ of mandamus or mandate ordering the
official to submit the measure to an election.
IV.

Pre-election Review of Substantive Validity

Most courts will not entertain a challenge to a measure's substantive
validity before the election. 4 8 A minority of courts, however, are willing
to conduct such review. 4 9 Arguably, pre-election review of a measure's
substantive validity involves issuing an advisory opinion, violates ripeness requirements and the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional
questions, and is an unwarranted judicial intrusion into a legislative
process.
A.

The ProhibitionAgainst Advisory Opinions

Some courts deny pre-election review of a measure's substantive validity on the ground that it would involve issuing an advisory opinion.50
The paradigmatic advisory opinion is ajudicial opinion on a bill pending
47 Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264, 276-79 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Legislature of Cal. v.
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 663-65, 669 P.2d 17, 19-20, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783-84 (1983) (per
curiam).
48 E.g., Diaz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 502 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Broucher v.
Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 460 & n.13 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other grounds by McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988); Tilson v. Mofford, 153 Ariz. 468,470, 737 P.2d 1367, 1369
(1987); Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervisors, 108 Ariz. 449, 452,
501 P.2d 391, 393-94 (1972) (en banc); Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 364-65, 404 P.2d 705, 709
(1965) (en banc); City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 264-65, 293 P.2d 974, 976 (1956) (en
banc); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 247, 69 N.E.2d 115, 127 (1946);
Leininger v. Alger, 316 Mich. 644, 654-55, 26 N.W.2d 348, 353 (1947); Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D.
218, 229, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (1932); State ey rel. Williams v. Brown, 52 Ohio St. 2d 13, 17-18, 368
N.E.2d 838, 841 (1977) (per curiam); State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown, 7 Ohio St. 3d 5, 6, 454 N.E.2d
1321, 1322 (1983) (per curiam); Oregon AFL-CIO v. Weldon, 256 Or. 307, 312, 473 P.2d 664, 667
(1970); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wash. 2d 85, 86-87, 436 P.2d 786, 787 (1968) (en
banc); State av rel. Donahue v. Coe, 49 Wash. 2d 410, 418, 302 P.2d 202, 206-07 (1956) (en banc).
See Grossman, The Initiative and Referendum Process: The Michigan Experience, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 77, 111
(1981); Note, The Judiciaryand PopularDemocracy: Should Courts Review Ballot Measures Priorto Elections?,
53 FORDHAM L. REV. 919, 922 (1985).

49 E.g., Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991, 996 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264, 279 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Fine v. Firestone, 443 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), vacatedon other grounds, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984); St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights v.
City Council, 289 N.W.2d 402, 405-06 (Minn. 1979); State ex rel. Steen v. Murray, 144 Mont. 61, 66,
394 P.2d 761, 763-64 (1964) (per curiam);Javers v. Council of New Orleans, 351 So. 2d 247, 249-50
(La. App. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 200 (1978); State ex rel. Voss v. Davis, 418 S.W.2d 163, 168
n.4 (Mo. 1967); State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, 330 Mo. 252, 255-57, 48 S.W.2d 891, 892-93 (1932).
See Grossman, supra note 48, at 113.
50 E.g., McKee v. City of Louisville, 200 Colo. 525, 531, 616 P.2d 969,973 (1980) (en banc); City
of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 266, 293 P.2d 974, 976 (1956) (en banc); Slack v. City of
Salem, 31 Il. 2d 174, 178, 201 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1964); State errel. Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7, 8
(Mo. 1983) (en banc); Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 229, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (1932); Jones v.
International Ass'n of Firefighters, 601 S.W.2d 454, 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); State ex rel.
O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wash. 2d 85, 86-87, 436 P.2d 786, 787 (1968) (en banc).
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in the legislature. Advisory opinions are impermissible in federal
courts5 ' and most state courts. Although ten states permit advisory opinions, they do so only upon the request of the legislature or the
52
governor.
The ban on advisory opinions in federal courts is based on the separation of powers doctrine 53 and the case or controversy requirement.
This requirement prohibits article III54courts from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions."
In addition to its constitutional foundations, the prohibition is premised on institutional concerns relating to the nature of the judicial function. Advisory opinions lack a factual record, 55 concreteness, 56 and a
clear focus on the precise issues believed necessary for careful adjudication. 57 The lack of a precise factual context can result in judicial pronouncements at abstract, general levels which overlook real-life
problems and questions of degree. 58
Another basis for the rule against advisory opinions is the doctrine
of strict necessity, which states that federal courts should not adjudicate
constitutional issues unless they are unavoidable. 59 While this notion
may be grounded partly in considerations of judicial economy, it rests
more firmly on the separation of powers doctrine and the idea that
unelected judges with life tenure should show restraint in exercising
60
power to invalidate legislation.
The policy ofjudicial restraint reflected in the advisory opinion doctrine may also be related to institutional self-preservation. A court which
exercises its power too early and too often may exhaust the good will it
enjoys from the people and other branches of government. 6 1 As Justice
Rutledge noted, "It is not without significance for the policy's validity
that the periods when the power has been exercised most readily and
broadly have been the ones in which this Court and the institution of
51 Federal courts cannot "give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative action."
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911).
52 Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 81 (1975).
53 Correspondence of theJustices, Letters from ChiefJustice John Jay and the AssociateJustices
to President George Washington (August 8, 1793); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (2d

ed. 1988).
54 Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945). Accord, United States v.
Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 300 (1909). See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1 (1972); United States v. Freuhauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Alder v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
55 See Frankfurter, A Vote on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924).
56 Some courts cite the lack of concreteness in denying pre-election review. E.g., City of Rocky
Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 265-66, 293 P.2d 974, 976 (1956) (en banc); Slack v. City of Salem. 31
Ill. 2d 174, 178, 201 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1964); cf. Hamilton v. Vaughan, 212 Mich. 31, 36-37. 179
N.W. 553, 555 (1920) (Sharpe, J., concurring) (the court is deciding "an abstract legal question. not
based on or arising out of any existing law or fact").
57 See United States v. Freuhauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
58

See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITrrTIONAL LAw 1538-39 (9th ed. 1975). See

generally Brilmayer, The JurisprudenceofArticle III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement. 93
HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979); Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Bilnayer. 93
HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980); Brilmayer, A Reply, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1727 (1980).

59 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 570 n.34 (1947).
60 See id. at 571.
61 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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judicial review have had their stormiest experiences. ' 62 Thus, the advisory opinion doctrine may also be based on "prudential decisions to conserve the energies (and the political capital) of federal
courts for a limited
63
number of truly important constitutional cases."
Pre-emptive striking of ballot measures by courts on grounds of substantive invalidity could foster anti-judicial sentiment. The courts could
be perceived, at least by the measure's supporters, as meddlers interfering with the process of popular legislation. Direct legislation is often
anti-governmental by nature-it serves as an escape valve for people
whose causes have been or probably will be unsuccessful in the ordinary
processes of representative government. 64 The populist sentiments of
frustration underlying direct legislation efforts will be exacerbated if a
branch of the government, the judiciary, deprives the people of their
right to vote. Direct legislation often involves hotly contested political
matters, 65 and too frequent interference with the initiative process by
courts could focus popular displeasure at the judiciary and undermine its
66
public support.
Pre-election lawsuits challenging initiatives could draw the courts
unnecessarily into the middle of highly charged political fights. For example, in the 1982 California Republican gubernatorial primary campaign, Attorney General George Deukmejian made his sponsorship of an
initiative called the Victims' Bill of Rights a centerpiece of his campaign.
On the night of his nomination, Deukmejian announced that as attorney
general he would press the California Supreme Court to rule before the
election on a pending case challenging the constitutionality of the initiative. 6 7 The California Supreme Court did rule on the measure two
months before the election, upholding it against substantive, procedural,
and subject matter challenges. 68 As a second example, threats of recall
and physical harm were directed at California Supreme Court justices as
62 331 U.S. at 572 n.38.
63 G. GUNTHER, supra note 58, at 1581.
64 Rooted in the progressive movement of the early 1900's, the initiative and referendum were
designed to
deprive machine government of the advantages it had in checkmating popular control, and
make government accessible to the superior disinterestedness and honesty of the average
citizen. Then, with the power of the bosses broken or crippled, it would be possible to
check the incursions of the interests upon the welfare of the people and realize a cleaner,
more efficient government.
R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 255 (1955). Whether the initiative and referendum have accomplished their objectives is a subject of much debate. See, e.g., W. CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 21-25 (1950); H. CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 306 (1914); D.
MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 21-27; W. MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIES 238-53 (4th ed.
1926).
65

Boalt Hall Professor Preble Stolz said, "It seems that we have come to expect at least one

politically explosive measure on the ballot for each statewide election." Kirsch, Initiatives-Cutting
Up the Constitution, CAL. LAw., Nov. 1984, at 35, 39. See Comment, supra note 41, at 463 n.12; Note,
The Proposed NVational Initiative Amendment: A Participatory Perspectiveon Substantive Restrictions and Procedural Requirements, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429, 429 (1981).
66 Fischer, Ballot Propositions:The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State ConstitutionalJurisprudence,I1
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 89 (1983).
67 Hager,JusticesAsked to Rule Quickly on Proposition 8, L.A. Times, June 15, 1982, § I, at 3, col. 2.
68 Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
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they prepared to hear arguments on the validity of Proposition 13 (the
69
tax limitation initiative) after its passage.
Because only a minority of ballot measures are successful, 7 0 courts
will invoke their power much less frequently if they review ballot measures on substantive grounds only after the election. In the majority of
cases, the election itself -will spare the court the political consequences of
having to invalidate the measure. This is significant because some courts
have found a high proportion of initiative measures to be substantively
unconstitutional. 7 1 The reasons for this phenomenon are not completely
identifiable, but one reason may be that the legislature's procedures are
more cautious and deliberative. Legislative proceedings typically involve
committee study, hearings, floor debate, passage by two legislative bodies, and assent by the executive. 7 2 Direct legislation lacks these procedural safeguards. Another reason may be that ballot measures are
sometimes majoritarian responses which tend to conflict with anti73
majoritarian constitutional protections.
An additional problem with pre-election review of substantive validity is that the time pressure created by the pending election can cause the
hasty adjudication of constitutional issues. 7 4 The time pressure increases
as the case passes through successive levels of appeal and the date of the
election approaches. Justice Douglas complained, "We are plagued with
election cases coming here on the eve of election, with the remaining
time so short we do not have the days needed for oral argument and for
reflection on the serious problems that are usually presented. 7 5 To alleviate this problem, some states require that suits challenging ballot
proposals must be filed a certain time before the election. 76 This re69 Comment, The Direct Initiative Process: Have Unconstitutional Methods of Presenting the Issues
Prejudiced Its Future?, 27 UCLA L. REV. 433, 435 n.13 (1979).
70 In states with signature thresholds of 8% or below, only 357o of statewide initiatives that have
appeared on the ballot since 1950 have passed. In states with higher signature thresholds, 47% of
statewide initiatives appearing on the ballot have passed. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 44. Of
course, most initiatives never even qualify for the ballot. For example, between 1970 and 1976, 104
initiatives were officially submitted to the attorney general prior to circulation. Of these, only 17
qualified for the ballot, and only four passed. Lee, California, in REFERENDUMS 91 (D. Butler & A.
Ranney ed. 1978).
71 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
72 See G. Baker, Judicial Review of Statewide Initiatives in California: Proposition 13 in Recent
Historical Perspective 2-3 (unpublished manuscript presented at the American Political Science Association's annual meeting, Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 1978, New York, N.Y.); Grossman, supra note 48, at
108.
73 See generally Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1978); Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135
(1981); Olson, Limitations and Litigation Approaches: The Local Power of Referendum in Federal and State
Courts-A Michigan Model, 50J. URB. L. 209 (1972); Sager, InsularMajorities Unabated: JWarth v. Seldin
and City of Eastlakev. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1978), Sirico, The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IowA L. REV. 637 (1980). One writer contends that the direct
legislation process is more likely to overlook minority interests because it lacks the legislature's reliance on pluralistic consensus formation. Bell, supra, at 13-14 n.53.
74 See Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 2 (Alaska 1979); AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 718, 686
P.2d 609, 630, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 110 (en banc) (Lucas, J., dissenting), stay denied sub nom. Uhler v.
AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1984); Note, supra note 48, at 931.
75 Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 120-21 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
76 For example, the Ohio Constitution requires suits involving procedural issues to be brought
at least 40 days before the election. OHmIO CONST. art. II, § 1(g). This restriction has been held to
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quirement mitigates the problem but does not solve it, since the case may
have to pass through multiple levels of appellate review, with the last
court receiving the case only days before the scheduled election.
Pre-election review of the substantive validity of a ballot measure is
similar to judicial review of a bill in the legislature prior to passage. It is
generally an improper intrusion on the legislative function and a premature and unnecessary exercise of judicial power. It has been argued that
pre-emptive review is more appropriate for popular legislation because a
bill in the legislature may still be amended before passage, whereas a
ballot proposal is in its final form for submission to the voters. 7 7 However, the advisory opinion doctrine prohibits review of a legislative bill
even in its final form, after passage by the legislature but before the governor signs it. The fact that a legislative bill can be amended merely adds
another contingency which makes ultimate enforcement of the challenged version of the bill even more speculative. The passage of an initiative measure is already sufficiently speculative to render pre-election
review of its substantive validity an unnecessary ruling on a hypothetical
(and improbable) question.
It could also be argued that greater judicial interference is justified
because the public and private expense of an initiative or referendum
election is likely greater than the expense of processing a bill in the legislature. However, protracted legislative hearings can be very expensive,
and they invite private lobbying expenses just as direct elections invite
private campaign expenses. Saving money would never be a legitimate
reason to enjoin a state legislature from conducting hearings on an unconstitutional bill. The reasons supporting the advisory opinion ban
simply outweigh any potential savings. Moreover, the legislature decides
how much to spend on its proceedings, and its decision is a nonjusticia78
ble political question.
The same arguments apply to direct legislation. 79 Public and private
expenses vary with the frequency of elections and the number of proposals that qualify for the ballot, which in turn are affected by the restrictiveness of the threshold requirements for qualifying measures for
elections.8 0 For example, high signature thresholds generally limit the
number of initiatives and popular referendums qualifying for the ballot,
apply to subject matter limitations as well. State ex rel. Schwartz v. Brown, 32 Ohio St. 2d 4, 10, 288
N.E.2d 821, 825-26 (1972).
77 See Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 762 n.5 (Alaska 1980); Note, supra note 48, at 931
n.52.
78 See Henkin, Is There a "'PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ. 597, 622-23 (1976). See generally Sharpf,judicial Review and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
79 [Expenditures for elections on invalid measures are] no more useless than the time and
money expended on other legislative proceedings that may ultimately produce an infirm
law. Democracy, whether direct or indirect, necessarily involves procedural inefficiencies
that may require significant spending of public monies. Inefficiencies and cost alone do
not justify enjoining popularly mandated legislative processes.
Note, supra note 48, at 932 (footnotes omitted). See Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d
658, 682, 669 P.2d 17, 34, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 798 (1983) (per curiam) (Richardson, J., dissenting);
Threadgill v. Cross, 26 Okla. 403, 414-15, 109 P. 558, 562-63 (1910); State ey rel. Evans v. Riiff, 73
S.D. 348, 352, 42 N.W.2d 887, 889 (1950).
80 There is a strong correlation between the stringency of states' signature requirements and the
number of measures that qualify for the ballot. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 42-43.
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and low thresholds lead to more qualifying initiatives and referendums. 8 '
The states decide what level of direct legislation costs they are willing to
bear by establishing ballot access requirements and by deciding whether
to permit special elections. These decisions by the states are nonjusticiable political questions, 2 and the states can change these requirements
whenever they deem it desireable to do so.
It might also be argued that the advisory opinion doctrine applies
with less force in direct legislation because the doctrine rests partly on
the separation of powers and the courts' respect for the legislature as a
coequal branch of government. However, in a representative democracy
83
the legislature's lawmaking powers are delegated to it by the people.
In direct legislation the people are acting as the legislature themselves,
and the courts should show appropriate deference to that ultimate lawmaking body. Indeed, many courts analogize to judicial noninterference
84
with legislative proceedings in declining pre-election review.
When pre-election relief is sought in federal court, the issue is not
the separation of powers but rather federalism. Initiatives and referendums are state and local legislative processes. Federal courts should refrain from interfering with those legislative processes and refuse to
review the substantive validity of measures before the election, 5 just as
federal courts should not interfere with lawmaking processes in state and
local legislatures until after a challenged law is passed and enforcement
becomes a realistic threat.
B.

Ripeness

Many courts refuse to conduct pre-election review of substantive validity because of the lack of ripeness.8 6 The ripeness requirement prevents judicial review when future events may affect a case, thus making
81 Id. at 42.
82 See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (state's decision whether to
permit direct legislation is a political question).
83, Some constitutional provisions authorizing popular legislation expressly state that it is a
power reserved to the people. E.g., ARIz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(1); ARK. CONST. amend. VII, § I;
CoLo. CONsT. art. V, § 1(1); FLA. CoNsT. art. XI, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. II,
§ 9; Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 49; NEB. CONST. art. III, &§ 2, 3; NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2(1); N.D.
CONsT. art. III, § I; OHIO CONsT. art. II, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 1; OR. CONsT. art. IV, § 1(2)(a);
S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. See also City ofEastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426
U.S. 668, 672 (1976); Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d
473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976).
84 E.g., Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervisors, 108 Ariz. 449,
451, 501 P.2d 391, 393-94 (1972) (en banc); People ex rel. O'Reilly v. Mills, 30 Colo. 262, 264, 70
P.2d 322, 333 (1902); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 247-48, 69 N.E.2d
115, 127-28 (1946); State a rel. Stokes v. Roach, 190 S.W. 277, 280 (Mo. 1916) (en banc); Anderson
v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 229, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (1932); Threadgill v. Cross, 26 Okla. 403, 412-13,
109 P. 558, 561-62 (1910); State frrel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or. 641, 647, 270 P. 513, 515 (1928) (en
banc).
85 Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970);
Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir. 1968).
86 E.g., Diaz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 502 F. Supp. 190, 193 (S.D. Fla. 1980); City of Rocky
Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 265-66, 293 P.2d 974, 976 (1956) (en banc); Slack v. City of Salem, 31
Ill. 2d 174, 178, 201 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1964); Stateexrel. Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7,8 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc); Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 229, 242 N.W. 687, 692 (1932); State ex rel. O'Connell v.
Kramer, 73 Wash. 2d 85, 86-87, 436 P.2d 786, 787 (1968) (en banc).
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later adjudication more appropriate.8 7 Under the doctrine, "[t]he danger that supposedly motivates [the plaintiff] must be real and immediate,
rather than distant and speculative. There must be a concrete demonstration that some harm will really occur .... "8 8 The ripeness doctrine is
justified by constitutional and institutional considerations similar to
some of those justifying the ban on advisory opinions: the lack of a concrete situation and a clear factual record to assure informed and narrow
adjudication, 9 the desire to avoid making unnecessary decisions about
difficult constitutional issues, and the need to conserve judicial resources
by deciding only those questions necessary to resolve real
controversies .90
Suits attacking the substantive validity of ballot measures involve a
double contingency which renders any injury speculative and uncertain.
First, the measure may not pass; only a minority do. 9 ' Even if public
opinion polls report that a particular measure enjoys majority support,
polls are sometimes flawed, and passage will depend on such variables as
campaign strategies, spending, and voter turnout. In many contested initiatives a significant opinion change occurs during the campaign.9 2 Second, even if the measure passes, there may be no threat of enforcement.
Prosecutors and other government officials often exercise their discretion not to enforce a law because of their doubts about its constitutionality, their perception of its social disutility, or their allocation of resources
to other tasks. Also, there is often the possibility that if enacted, the law
may be applied in a constitutional manner.9 3 Therefore, the uncertainty
about the measure's passage and the government's implementation of it
creates a double contingency which makes suits attacking the substantive
constitutionality of ballot measures unripe for review.9 4
In Poe v. Ullman, 95 the Supreme Court held nonjusticiable a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut
anti-birth control law which, except for a test case, had not been enforced
87 L. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 77. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 294-97 (1981); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v.
Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947).
88

Brilmayer, The Jurisprudenceof Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93

HARV. L. REV. 297, 299 (1979). But cf.Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (physicians challenging a state criminal abortion statute presented a justiciable controversy despite the lack of any evidence of prosecution or threatened prosecution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (Black, J.,concurring) (case ripe although there had never been a
single attempt to enforce statute).
89 "Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate
adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the
proper exercise of the judicial function." International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954).
90 See L. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 77-82.
91 See supra note 70.
92 Magleby, Opinion Formation and Opinion Change on Statewide Ballot Propositions, in M. MARGOLIS &
G. MAUSER, MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION (forthcoming).
93 Diaz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 502 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Grossman, supra note
48, at 112.
94 Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 75 (In cases of double contingency-referring to the threat of
enforcement and the law's applicability to the litigant's conduct-article III justiciability is lacking.).
95 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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for more than 75 years. 9 6 Just as no threat was presented by the statute
in that case, nojusticiable threat is posed by a statute which may never be
enacted. Pre-election review of a ballot proposal's substantive validity
merely addresses hypothetical legal questions not involving any existing
law or threat of enforcement, and therefore should be impermissible.
C.

The Courts as Budget Cutters

A powerful argument against the "waste of taxpayer money" basis
for substantive review is that no constitutional or statutory provision authorizes courts to cancel elections simply because they are wasteful. The
constitutional provisions and statutes governing initiatives and referendums in effect provide that measures shall be submitted to a vote when
the specified procedural and subject matter requirements are met. If the
process adopted by the drafters is wasteful at times, the state can change
the process. The decision of how much money to spend on direct legislation is a political question. The court is not a super budget cutter authorized to prevent government officials from performing their
mandatory constitutional duties simply because it concludes that the performance of those duties will waste the taxpayers' money. Government
officials violate no constitutional provision or statute by submitting the
measure to a vote, and therefore the court is not authorized to stop
97
them.
When government officials refuse to submit the measure to a vote,
the analysis is a little more complicated. It could be argued that before
the court orders affirmative equitable relief, it has the discretion to consider whether it would be ordering someone to do a futile or meaningless
act. Therefore, some courts will review a measure's substantive validity
before granting a writ of mandamus directing the officials to hold an
98
election.
Ultimately, however, the question is one of the intent of the drafters.
The governing constitutional provisions and statutes require government officials to submit a measure to a vote if the procedural and subject
matter limitations are met. They do not expressly authorize them to refuse whenever they believe that the measure conflicts with some paramount law, 9 9 and there is no evidence of legislative intent that they be so
authorized. It is more likely that the drafters intended that the determination of substantive validity should be reserved for the courts-if and
96 Id. at 501.
97 See Sartor v. City of Huron, 16 Ohio Misc. 127, 129, 241 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1968) ("For this
court to place any limitation on the power of the electors to initiate... legislation other than what is
expressly provided for in the Constitution and the Revised Code would amount to an invasion of
legislative power by the judicial branch of government."); Note, supra note 48, at 922.
98 E.g., State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, 330 Mo. 252, 48 S.W.2d 891 (1932) (en banc); White v.
Welling, 89 Utah 335, 340-41, 57 P.2d 703, 705 (1936);Javers v. Council of New Orleans, 351 So. 2d
247 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
99 See Coleman v. Bench, 96 Utah 143, 147, 84 P.2d 412, 413 (1938); White v. Welling, 89 Utah
335, 340-41, 57 P.2d 703, 705 (1936).
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when the measure passes-just as it is for other legislation. Therefore,
the government officials should be ordered to hold the election. 100
Moreover, the time pressure and the lack of a concrete factual record or specific application make for just as poor an adjudication of substantive validity in a mandamus action as in an injunctive suit. Therefore,
pre-election review of substantive validity should not depend on the particular remedy sought.
D.

Free Speech Values

Another argument against pre-election review of the substantive validity of ballot measures is that initiatives and referendums serve a secondary purpose of expressing popular will and sending messages to
government. I0 1 This purpose is fulfilled even when a measure is ultimately held unenforceable after the election. An overwhelming vote on
an issue may persuade legislators to consider changing the applicable
constitutional provision or statute, or to enact legislation which accomplishes some of the same results sought by the ballot measure without
offending constitutional or statutory constraints. Plebiscites are a form
of political speech near the very center of democratic values. 10 2 Free
speech values should lead to the conclusion that if a measure's proponents have properly qualified the measure for a plebiscite, they are entitled to have one, even if the measure will never be enforced.
E. The "Rights'"Analysis
It might be argued that the electorate has no "right" to enact unconstitutional measures, and therefore no right to vote on them. However,
the significance of unconstitutionality is not that the electorate does not
have the right to vote on a measure, but that the government does not
have the right to enforce it. By analogy, although it might theoretically
be said that a state legislature does not have the "right" to enact unconstitutional legislation, it does not follow that the courts can preclude the
legislature from voting on unconstitutional bills.
F.

The "Clear Invalidity" Test

Some courts will strike a measure from the ballot if it is "clearly"
3
unconstitutional 10
or unconstitutional on its face. 10 4 They reason that it
100 See Union Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. 1984) (en banc);Jones v. International Assoc. of Firefighters, 601 S.W.2d 454, 455-56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Edwards v. Murphy,
256 S.W.2d 470, 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). But see Nebraska ex rel.
Brant, 217 Neb. 632, 636, 350
N.W.2d 18, 21 (1984) (dicta) (secretary of state may refuse to hold election if proposal is unconstitutional on its face).
101 See Note, The Election Ballot as a Forumfor the Expression of ldeas-Georgesv. Carney, 32 DE PAUL
L. REV. 901 (1983). Cf Diaz v.Board of County Commr's, 502 F. Supp. 190, 193 (S.D. Fla. 1980)
(initiative and referendum are means of preserving right to petition government for redress).
102 But see Georges v. Carney, 691 F.2d 297, 300-02 (7th Cir. 1982) (initiative is not a form of
speech protected by the first amendment).
103 E.g., Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 665, 669 P.2d 17, 20, 194 Cal. Rptr.
781, 784 (1983) (per curiam); Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337,
342 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam); Fine v. Firestone, 443 So. 2d 253, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), vacated
on other grounds, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984).
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makes little sense to waste taxpayer money on an election that would be
clearly futile. Moreover, the need for a factual record is less if the measure is invalid on its face. However, the clear invalidity test has a number
of problems. First, mere waste in a procedure mandated by the drafters
of the state constitution does not authorize judicial intervention. Second, except for the need for a factual record, the test ignores the rest of
the advisory opinion and ripeness concerns. Lastly, it creates a system of
double judicial review.' 0 5 Before the election the courts must decide
whether the clear invalidity test is met. If it is not, and the measure succeeds at the polls, the courts will then likely have to review the measure
again under the standards of plenary review.
V. Failure to Meet Procedural or Subject Matter Requirements
Courts generally permit pre-election review of challenges based on
procedural' 0 6 or subject matter limitations. 0 7 However, a minority of
courts deny pre-election review of some of these requirements. 0 8 Regarding procedural defects such as form, signature, and title and summary requirements, most states either prohibit post-election review
104 State ex rel. Dahl v. Lange, 661 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); State ex rel. Samuelson v.
Conrad, 25 Ohio Misc. 13, 15, 265 N.E.2d 803, 807 (1968); Coleman v. Bench, 96 Utah 143, 147, 84
P.2d 412, 413 (1938); White v. Welling, 89 Utah 335, 340-41, 57 P.2d 703, 705 (1936).
105 See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 240-41, 651 P.2d 274, 276, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32
(1982) (en banc); Hawn v. County of Ventura, 73 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1012, 141 Cal. Rptr. 111, 112
(1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978); Note, supra note 48, at 932.
106 Comment, PreelectionJudicialReview: Taking the Initiativein Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1216,
1226 (1983). E.g., Tilson v. Mofford, 153 Ariz. 468, 470, 737 P.2d 1367, 1369-70 (1987); Iman v.
Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 364-65,404 P.2d 705, 709 (1965) (en banc); Unlimited Progress v. Portland, 213
Or. 193, 195, 324 P.2d 239, 240 (1958); Barnes v. Paulus, 36 Or. App. 327, 332, 588 P.2d 1120,
1123 (1978). In practice, courts follow the doctrine of substantial compliance and overlook technical
but harmless procedural violations. Comment, supra, at 1219; Comment, supra note 41, at 470-71.
E.g., Assembly of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 652-53, 639 P.2d 939, 948, 180 Cal. Rptr. 297,
306, applicationfor stay denied sub nom. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Burton, 455 U.S. 1301, cert. denied,
456 U.S. 941 (1982); California Teachers Ass'n v. Collins, 1 Cal. 2d 202, 204, 34 P.2d 134, 134
(1934); State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 521, 529-32, 162 N.W.2d 262, 268-69 (1968);
Oklahomans for Modern Alcoholic Beverage Controls, Inc. v. Shelton, 501 P.2d 1089, 1092-94
(Okla. 1972).
107 E.g., Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 460 (Alaska 1974); Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 36
P.2d 549 (1934); AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 696, 686 P.2d 609, 614, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (en
banc), stay deniedsub nor. Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310 (Rehnquist, CircuitJustice 1984); Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 339-40 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam);
Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 83 Ill. 2d 236, 253-60,415 N.E.2d 368, 37882 (1980); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 247-48, 69 N.E.2d 115, 127-28
(1946); Ferency v. Secretary of State, 409 Mich. 569, 297 N.W.2d 544 (1980); County Rd. Ass'n v.
Board of State Canvassers, 407 Mich. 101, 282 N.W.2d 774 (1979); West v. City of Portage, 392
Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Board of County Rd. Comm'rs v. Riley, 391 Mich. 666, 218
N.W.2d 144 (1974); Kuhn v. Department of Treasury, 384 Mich. 378, 183 N.W. 2d 796 (1971); City
of Detroit v. City Clerk, 98 Mich. App. 136, 139, 296 N.W.2d 207, 208, leave to appeal denied, 408
Mich. 956 (1980); In re Initiative Petition No. 314, 625 P.2d 595 (Okla. 1980); Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 740, 746, 620 P.2d 82, 86 (1980).
108 E.g., Beechnau v. Austin, 42 Mich. App. 328, 331, 201 N.W.2d 699, 701 (1972) (single subject); Barnes v. Paulus, 36 Or. App. 327, 332, 588 P.2d 1120, 1125 (1978) (single subject); Kolsti v.
Guest, 565 S.W.2d 556, 557 (rex. Civ. App. 1978) (numerical signature requirement).
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under the "election cures all" doctrine10 9 or place a higher burden of
proof on challengers. 1 0
In states with taxpayer or other broad standing grounds," 1 pre-election challenges based on alleged failures to meet procedural or subject
matter requirements should be adjudicated because they do not involve
the same level of justiciability issues discussed in Part IV above. Procedural and subject matter requirements could be viewed as jurisdictional
limitations; 1 2 government officials do not have jurisdiction to conduct
an election on a measure if these requirements have not been met, and
this issue is immediately justiciable.
For example, suppose a pre-election suit challenges the validity of
the signatures qualifying the measure for the ballot. The issue raised is
not the hypothetical question whether the law, if passed, would be constitutionally defective; rather, it is the present and ripe question whether
the measure's proponents are entitled to invoke the direct legislation
process at all. The case is concrete and specific, and the record will not
be improved by waiting until after the election to see how the law is applied in a specific case. For both procedural and subject matter requirements, the factual controversy-whether these requirements are metexists before the election." 3 In general, post-election events will not
sharpen the issues, and no additional facts are needed for the decision. 114 No contingencies make the issue speculative, hypothetical, or
abstract, and no advisory opinion on the substantive validity of the measure is involved. Furthermore, the doctrine of avoiding constitutional
questions unless necessary is not violated: the only constitutional issues
involved are those specifically governing the proponents' right to invoke
the direct legislation process. Determination of those questions before
the election is necessary because the basis of the challenge is that the
proponents are not entitled to invoke the process and thereby cause the
expenditure of public funds. If the election is permitted, the very injury
complained of will occur.
109

E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 15.45.230 (1982); N.D. CONST. art III, § 6; Renck v. Superior Court, 66

Ariz. 320, 187 P.2d 656 (1947); Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 268, 165 S.W.2d 657, 662 (1942).
110

Comment, supra note 106, at 1227; Comment, supra note 41, at 481 (some states require a

showing that the violations misled a substantial number of voters). E.g., City of Glendale v.
Buchanan, 195 Colo. 267, 272, 578 P.2d 221, 224 (1978) (plaintiff must show good cause for failure
to challenge the measure before the election); City of Jackson v. Nims, 316 Mich. 694, 713, 26

N.W.2d 569, 578 (1947).
111 E.g., Legislature of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 666, 669 P.2d 17, 19, 194 Cal. Rptr.
781, 785 (1983) (per curiam) (plaintiffs were taxpayers, electors, and legislators); Committee for
New Cobb County Revenue v. Brown, 228 Ga. 364, 368, 185 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1971) (plaintiffs were
county citizens and taxpayers); Slama v. Attorney General, 384 Mass. 620, 622, 428 N.E.2d 134, 136

(1981) (plaintiffs were voters and signers of the initiative petition); McCaffrey v. Gartley, 377 A.2d
1367, 1370 (Me. 1977) (plaintiffs were voters, property taxpayers, and signers of the initiative peti-

tion); State ex rel. Wenzel v. Murray, 178 Mont. 441, 448, 585 P.2d 633, 638 (1978) (plaintiff was
taxpayer, property owner, and elector); Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Packers Ass'n v. Appling,

232 Or. 230, 234, 375 P.2d 71, 73 (1962) (plaintiff was person adversely affected by an act of election
officials).
112 See Sirico, supra note 73, at 663 (subject matter limitations are jurisdictional).
113 Grossman, supra note 48, at 116.
114 Id. A full factual record is not as critical for subject matter challenges because the violation is
generally discernible from the language of the proposal itself. See Comment, supra note 106, at
1230.
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The constitutional provisions and statutes governing direct legislation generally provide that measures shall be submitted to a vote if the
procedural and subject matter limitations are met. If government officials refuse to certify a qualified measure for the ballot, they should be
subject to the same judicial remedies available against any government
official who refuses to perform statutorily mandated duties. If there is no
judicial review, government officials could completely nullify the initiative and referendum processes, subject to control only by impeachment.
Also, by providing that qualified measures shall be submitted to a vote,
the governing provisions imply that nonqualifying measures shall not be
submitted to a vote. A government official who spends taxpayer money
for an unauthorized election is violating the law and should be subject to
the same judicial review as other officials.
It could be argued that no pre-election review of procedural or subject matter challenges should be permitted since, by analogy, courts cannot adjudicate procedural or subject matter limitations on bills in the
legislature. However, the analogy to the state legislature is not a perfect
one. Because of separation of powers concerns, the legislature is seen as
the sole guardian and enforcer of its internal rules. However, the procedural and subject matter limitations which apply in direct legislation are
state constitutional provisions and statutes, not internal rules of the legislature. Also, since the electorate has much less ability than the legislature to make sure that the legislative rules are followed, the courts
properly have the role of policing the integrity of the process, 1 5 just as
they do in other elections. As they are the guardians of other constitutional rights, they should also be the guardians of the people's right to
procedural fairness in initiative and referendum elections.I16 The alternative is to vest all pre-election protective power in the official who certifies measures for election. Since this official may be a part of the political
establishment that the initiative and referendum processes are designed
to circumvent; vesting the official with unreviewable power is inconsistent with the very notion of popular legislation.
Pre-election review of jurisdictional defects may also give the measure's proponents time to cure the defects before the election, thus saving time and money. 1' 7 When the alleged defect is in the title or
summary placed by the government official or in the manner of certifica8
tion, the official may be able to cure the defect before the election."
It is true that judicial resources and political capital would be conserved if courts waited until after the election and addressed procedural
and subject matter issues only for successful measures. However, the basis of taxpayer standing is that the expenditure of public funds on the
election is illegal. If the election is permitted, the very injury complained
115 Pre-election review ofjurisdictional requirements "promotes the voter protection intended by
the restrictions on the initiative process." Comment, supra note 106, at 1217.
116 See Dust v. Reviere, 277 Ark. 1, 4, 638 S.W.2d 663, 665 (1982); Metropolitan Dade County v.
Shriver, 365 So. 2d 210,212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Coleman v. Bench, 96 Utah 143, 147,84 P.2d
412, 413 (1938).
117 Comment, supra note 106, at 1217, 1231.
118 Id.at 1231.
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of will occur. In addition, the signature requirement is designed to avoid
the cost of elections on issues with little public support, to insure that
frivolous or unreasonably narrow issues do not frustrate the voters, and
to keep the ballot manageable." 19 Unlimited access to the ballot for proposals could undermine the direct legislation process, since the presence
of too many proposals might frustrate or overwhelm voters. Voter falloff
is already a problem; sometimes as many as twenty-five percent of those
who turn out to vote for candidates in statewide elections do not vote on
state propositions. 20 Moreover, voters may be less able or willing to
inform themselves about a large number of measures. Postponing judicial review of the signature requirement until after the election therefore
fails to afford the protections the signature requirement was designed to
provide.
Accelerated review also can be a problem in procedural and subject
matter cases. However, the consequences are less severe when procedural or subject matter limitations are adjudicated than when fundamental constitutional questions which can affect the basic political and legal
framework of society are subjected to hyper-accelerated review. In any
event, the courts have equitable discretion to deny relief when the challenge is brought too late to allow sufficent time for review. 12 ' Also, a
partial solution sometimes used by the United States Supreme Court in
election cases is to issue the decision quickly and to issue the opinion
later. 122
Sometimes it is difficult to tell whether a particular restriction is a
subject matter limitation or a general substantive prohibition. Subject
matter restrictions that appear in the constitutional provision or statutory
section that authorizes direct legislation are usually easily identifiable. 2 3
However, subject matter limitations need not appear in the authorizing
section, since that requirement would elevate form over substance. For
example, some courts hold that zoning is not a proper subject matter for
initiatives because the initiative process does not provide for notice and
119 See Magleby, Ballot Access for Initiatives and PopularReferendums: The Importance of Petition Circulation and Signature 'alidation Procedures, 2J. L. & POL. 287, 288 (1985).
120 D. MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 46.
121 Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 2 (Alaska 1979) (dictum); Brown v. McDaniel, 244 Ark. 362,
366, 427 S.W.2d 193, 195 (1968); Anne Arundel County v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788
(1976); Maginnis v. Childs, 284 Or. 337, 340, 587 P.2d 460, 461 (1978) (en banc).
122 For example, in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154 (1952) (per curiam), the case was argued March 31,
1952 and decided April 3, 1952 (mandate issued forthwith). The primary election was scheduled for
May 6, 1952. The court filed its opinion April 15, 1952, 12 days after issuing its decision. 343 U.S.
214, 216 (1952).
123 However, some restrictions which appear in or near the authorizing section are really substantive restrictions. For example, MASS. CONST. amend, art. 48, pt. 2, § 2 provides:
No proposition inconsistent with any one of the following rights of the individual, as at
present declared in the declaration of rights, shall be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: The right to receive compensation for private property appropriated to public use; the right of access to and protection in courts of justice; the right of trial by jury;
protection from unreasonable search, unreasonable bail and the law martial; freedom of the
press; freedom of speech; freedom of elections; and the right of peaceable assembly.
These are substantive rather than subject matter restrictions because they inquire whether proposed
measures have a specified effect, not whether they address a particular subject matter.
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hearing as required by other constitutional provisions. 24 Also, in some
states initiatives may be used to amend but not to revise the state constitution, i.e., they may add a provision to the constitution but not change
an existing provision. This is because the state constitution explicitly
provides special requirements for revising the constitution, and the initiative process does not satisfy these requirements.' 2 5 Such restrictions
are genuine subject matter limitations because they simply exclude initiatives from certain subject matters.' 26 On the other hand, general constitutional or statutory restrictions that ban all laws which have a specified
effect (such as laws abridging the freedom of speech) are general substantive prohibitions, not subject matter limitations. Challenges based
on them should be reviewed only after the election.
Some restrictions are substantive prohibitions rather than subject
matter limitations even though they apply only to direct legislation. For
example, the Massachusetts Constitution provides:
No proposition inconsistent with any one of the following rights of the
individual, as at present declared in the declaration of rights, shall be
the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: The right to receive compensation for private property appropriated to public use;
the right of access to and protection in courts of justice; the right of
trial by jury; protection from unreasonable search, unreasonable bail
and the law martial; freedom of the press; freedom 12of
7 speech; freedom
of elections; and the right of peaceable assembly.
These are substantive prohibitions rather than subject matter restrictions
because they inquire whether proposed measures have a specified effect,
not whether they address a particular subject matter. A second example
is the California Supreme Court's holding that a direct legislation measure may not impair essential governmental services.' 28 While this restriction applies only to direct legislation and not to all laws, it is so
amorphous that it does not really identify a particular topic.' 29 Rather,
the restriction provides that direct legislation measures cannot have a
specified effect, and it is therefore a substantive restriction.
124 See Comment, supra note 43, at 97-106. But see Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (zoning ordinances are a proper
subject matter for initiatives despite the absence of notice and hearing); San Diego Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
125 E.g., McFadden v.Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
126 We have categorized the single subject rule as a subject matter restriction because it inquires
whether a measure addresses more than one subject. While it might be argued that the single subject rule is a procedural requirement pertaining to the form of the ballot measure, the rule really
requires inquiry into what subject matters the measure addresses, which is not simply a question of
form. In any event, since we argue that the same rule should apply to both categories, the classification makes no difference for purposes of our analysis.
127 MAss. CONST. amend, art. 48, pt. 2, § 2.
128 Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 258, 651 P.2d 274, 287, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,43-45 (1982);
Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 134, 222 P.2d 225, 230 (1950).
129 Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (test inquiring whether
federal statutes impair "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions is uncertain and unworkable). For criticism of Brosnahan, see Fischer, supra note 66, at 55-59.
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A "Circuit Breaker" Exception

This Article has argued that pre-election review of a measure's substantive validity should generally be denied, but that pre-election review
of procedural and subject matter challenges should be permitted.
Although this model works almost all the time, there are extreme cases in
which pre-election review of substantive validity should also be allowed.
While the values which argue against pre-election review are very important, they are not absolute, and in special circumstances they can be outweighed by serious injury to other fundamental public values.
Therefore, there should be a limited "circuit breaker" exception to the
general principle of judicial nonintervention. In cases involving a present, significant, irreparable injury to a fundamental public interest, the
court should be able to review pre-election challenges to substantive validity.' 30 The exception should be as limited as possible to reflect an
appropriate deference for the legislative process, and should not be invoked if less onerous alternatives are available to avoid or mitigate the
31
injury.'
For example, in Legislature of Californiav. Deukmejian, 13 2 the California
Supreme Court cancelled the special election on the Sebastiani reapportionment initiative because it found the measure clearly unconstitutional.
The court cited two facts to justify its pre-election review. 133 First, the
34
projected cost to the taxpayers of the special election was $15 million.1
As argued earlier, the cost of direct legislation is a political question and
does not justify judicial intervention. 135 Second, the implementation of
changes in district boundaries so close to the June 1984 primary election
would make orderly conduct of that election impossible.1 36 The timing
of the initiative election significantly injured the fundamental public interest in the June 1984 election. Before reviewing the measure's substantive validity, however, the court should have considered less onerous
alternatives. For example, the court could have solved the problem by
merely delaying the initiative until the June 1984 election, which would
130

See Comment,Judicial Intervention in the Preelection Stage of the Initiative Process: A Change of Policy

by the California Supreme Court, 15 PAc. L.J. 1127, 1147-48 (1984) (advocating a limited exception
when there are serious consequences and no alternatives to avoid them.)
131 See id. at 1147-49.
132 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (per curiam).
133 The court also treated the case as one involving a prohibited subject matter. The California
Constitution provides that in the year following each national census, the state legislature shall reapportion the districts. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1. The court interpreted this provision to mean that
redistricting could not occur more than once per decade, whether by the legislature or by initiative.
34 Cal. 3d at 671-74, 669 P.2d at 25-26, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90. Since the legislature had passed
redistricting legislation in 1982, the court issued a writ ofmandate preventing the special election on
the initiative. The court referred to prior cases involving pre-election review of subject matter limitations, and then stated: "Here, as in those cases, the challenge goes to the power of the electorate
to adopt the proposal in the first instance. The challenge does not require even a cursory glance at
the substance of the initiative itself. The question is, in a sense, jurisdictional." 34 Cal. 3d at 667,
669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
134 34 Cal. 3d at 666, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
135 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
136 34 Cal. 3d at 666, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785.

19891

INITIATIVES AND REFERENDUMS

have meant that the existing districting plan would be used for that
3 7
election.'
The alternative of delaying the election would have been preferable
to denying the electorate the right to vote and would have reduced judicial interference with the initiative process. Since pre-election review of
a ballot proposition generally involves a suit in equity, the court has equitable discretion to fashion a remedy which will accomodate the interests
of the parties. Therefore, courts should not be limited to the two alternatives of striking or not striking the ballot proposal, but should also
have the power to delay the election when absolutely necessary.
The circuit breaker exception might also apply when the election
causes widespread uncontrollable violence. In Holmes v. Leadbetter138 and
Otey v. Common Council,'3 9 federal district courts enjoined elections on
anti-open housing initiatives because the courts considered the measures
clearly unconstitutional and because of threatened race riots. 1 4 0 However, the Sixth Circuit may have overruled Holmes in Ranjel v. City of Lansing. 141 The court stated that citizens should not be deprived of their
right to vote merely because a riot threatens, and that it is more appropriate to enjoin the unlawful acts of rioters than to deprive the electorate
of its right to vote.1 42 However, since no riot was threatened in Ranjel, 143 the language might be dicta.
Threats of violence should not per se justify pre-election review,
since such threats (and even acts) are not infrequent in elections, 14 4 and
since such a rule might encourage those seeking pre-election review
themselves to use threats or acts of violence. If violent civil strife appears
imminent, the court should consider the government's ability to quell the
violence. If the government appears incapable of controlling the violence, the court should have the authority to delay the election until tensions subside-an alternative less onerous than cancellation. If delaying
the election is not a viable option (e.g., if it would moot the election), the
court should be able to invoke the circuit breaker exception and review
the measure's substantive validity. In most cases, either the government
will be able to control the violence or delaying the election will be a viable option. Therefore, invocation of the circuit breaker exception would
be extremely rare.
137 See Comment, supra note 130, at 1147.
138 294 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
139 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
140 Although in Holmes v. Leadbetter the court said it did not base its decision on "what is conceded to be the substantial exacerbation of public and private emotion" which would be caused by
the election, 294 F. Supp. at 996, it referred to the riots repeatedly in the opinion, id. at 993, 995.
Moreover, the same court later said that the case must be viewed in light of the 1968 Detroit riots.
Yarborough v. City of Warren, 383 F. Supp. 676, 685 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (addressing issue of denial
of constitutional rights based on theory of psychological impact).
141 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970). Also, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court subsequently described Oley as contradictory to the "general tenor of Wisconsin law." State ex
rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 97, 112, 255 N.W.2d 449, 456 (1977). Of course, since
Otey applied federal and not state law, this case did not overrule Otey.
142 417 F.2d at 324.
143 Id.
144 For example, candidates are often targets of assassination attempts, but this fact does not
justify the cancellation of elections.
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The circuit breaker exception is not an exception to the doctrine of
ripeness, because ripeness is satisfied when a significant present injury is
produced by contemplation of a future event.1 4 5 Nor is it an exception to
the argument that state statutes do not authorize pre-election substantive
review, since statutes
do authorize the granting of injunctions to prevent
14 6
irreparable injury.
Although the circuit breaker exception does involve advisory opinions and interference with legislative processes, these values must be
weighed against the gravity of the threatened injury. Indeed, this kind of
weighing occupies a historically established place in the discretion inherent in equitable remedies. Among other things, the court should consider whether the measure is unconstitutional on its face or whether a
factual record is needed for adjudication.
The need for a limited circuit breaker exception should not be seen
as a defect in the symmetry of the law. Formal logic and abstract theory
must be tempered by pragmatic realities; otherwise the law is unreflective
14 7
of real world conditions and unresponsive to real human needs.
VII. Conclusion
With increasing frequency, courts are being asked to engage in preelection review of initiatives and referendums. In general, courts should
not conduct pre-election review of a measure's substantive validity because it involves issuing an advisory opinion, violates ripeness requirements and the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions,
and interferes with a legislative process. Because submitting a substantively invalid measure to an election violates no constitutional or statutory provision, courts should generally have no authority to prevent the
election. The amount of taxpayer money to be spent on direct legislation
involves a political question and varies with the restrictiveness of the ballot access requirements adopted by each state. While there should be a
circuit breaker exception when the election causes a present, significant,
irreparable injury to a fundamental public interest, this exception should
be extremely limited.
On the other hand, challenges alleging failure to comply with procedural requirements or subject matter limitations should be reviewable
before the election in states with taxpayer or other broad standing
grounds. This review does not involve an advisory opinion or violate the
ripeness doctrine; rather, it addresses the present and justiciable issue of
whether a government official should conduct, and whether taxpayer
money should finance, an unauthorized election.
145
146
147

L. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 80.
E.g., UTAH R. Civ. P. 65A(b), (e).
Cf 0. HOLMES,JR., THE COMMON LAW 1, 1 (1881):
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and
it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics.

